is the western style of environmental protection policymaking essential for successful environmental policies? many traditional analyses of environmental policy making assume a model based on a zero-sum game setting between business interests that want to suppress strict environmental protections for business profits and self-sacrificing environmental ngOs (engOs) that want to impose strict environmental policies. The theoretical reasons of this traditional framework come from the assumption that the environment is a collective good, which induces collective action problems that can be solved only by dedicated self-sacrificing social actors such as engOs. however, the non-western setting of political culture challenges this view. when environmental policies are set up in the condition that 'kills three birds with one stone,' or solving three problems, namely, achieving economic growth, reducing energy consumption, and protecting environment with a coherent policy, an alternative model of environmental policymaking can achieve significant environmental protection. Japan achieved the strictest environmental policies in the world without relying on engOs in the 1970s. Japan's model is applicable to contemporary china as both countries share many similar institutions and the political culture of conformity, which shows a stark contrast to the more confrontational political culture of the west. china need not wait for the development of strong engOs to implement successful environmental policies in the future. yet, one major precaution of this model is called for: The accident happening at the fukushima daiichi nuclear Power Plant may be a side effect of this Japan model.
Introduction
while the author is writing this article, the worst nuclear accident in the world since the chernobyl accident in 1986 has been taking place in fukushima, Japan. The accident's ending is still not in sight while significant efforts have been involved, and slow but steady progress to resolve this crisis is taking place. This ongoing nuclear accident at the fukushima daiichi nuclear Power Plant is, in a sense, a stepson of the Japan model of environmental policymaking-the model that brought Japan into one of the most environmentally successful economies in the world in the 1970s. Although this accident would not have taken place had it not been for the strongest earthquake in the history of Japan on march 11, 2011, various shortcomings revealed after the accident can be partially attributed to a side effect of the Japan model. This article argues that a distinctive model of a relatively conformist society compared to the more confrontational western society was able to bring Japan to the forefront of environmental success achieving economic development, energy saving, and environmental protection simultaneously. yet, the same model contains some of the shortcomings revealed in the ongoing nuclear accident in Japan.
The most important assumption of the traditional model of environmental politics is that the environmental issues are inevitably a zero-sum game in nature. if one wants to protect the environment, economic activities must be curtailed because any economic activities will result in adding pollution to the atmosphere. There must be a 'sacrifice' that cannot be compensated economically to reduce pollutions. furthermore, an essential social actor to solve this zero-sum problem is a dedicated, altruistic social actor, typically represented as environmental ngOs (engOs) because the environment is a collective good, which is characterised as a good whose users cannot be discriminated. clean air, water, and soil benefit unspecified individuals indiscriminately. A collective good usually induces collective action problems. since the investment of one party will never be recuperated, no rational party has incentives to invest to protect the environment because they will never reclaim the value of their investment proportionately while everyone acknowledges the disastrous consequence of the environmental degradation. Thus, the study of environmental policy making has focused on the correlation between strong engOs and successful environmental policy implementation. some scholars argue that the lack of strong engOs are the reason that Japan cannot be a leader in environmental protection in spite of its success in the 1970s.1
The traditional understanding of environmental protection based on this zero-sum game setting and engOs cannot explain two significant cases of environmental success and failure. first, it cannot explain the success
